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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
Acknowledging the dangers for individuals’ privacy hidden in the widespread use of 
mobile applications, the dissertation studies the current practices of five of the top 
famous mobile applications; Facebook, Google Search, Google Maps, Foursquare and 
WhatsApp in Android and iOS are examined with regard to the installation procedure 
and the Privacy Policy documents provided to users. How applications access and 
process users’ information stored on the device? For what purposes? What information 
do they provide to them about this process? How and what are the users asked to agree 
to? From a legal point of view, do the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directives protect 
users in the European Union territory when the aforementioned applications process 
their personal data? When yes, do the current practices regarding the installation 
procedure and Privacy Policy documents reconcile with the prerequisites of these 
Directives concerning the acquisition of valid consent for the processing of personal 
data? With particular focus on the examination of the consent related issues, the 
dissertation elaborates on all the above questions and attempts to provide responses.  
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Chapter 1-Introduction 
1.1 Mobile applications posing a threat on the protection of 
users’ personal information; description and significance of 
the problem. 
 
The overwhelmed everyday life of individuals nowadays demands quick, smooth and, 
preferably, cheap or free solutions that can satisfy their needs. Those solutions are at a 
great extent already provided and are still blossoming and improving. Where? In our 
mobile devices. Simply by connecting those to the internet and by clicking some buttons 
and basic, everyday needs are covered. May sound magical or alien, but is it true and 
real. Mobile application developers entered the forefront of innovation and have been 
“drawing” applications for, almost, every human need. Although there is no doubt that 
mobile devices together with mobile applications have revolutionized peoples’ reality, 
it seems that the saying “everything comes at a cost” or at least “...at a risk” is being 
proven, again.  
 
Smart mobile devices and mobile applications are highly interdependent. The hardware 
and software of smart mobile devices (hereinafter “mobile devices”) is especially 
manufactured to be online, detect the location of the device and interact with the 
mobile applications. A mobile application (hereinafter “app”) is a software, small and 
specific, especially designed to run on smart mobile devices.1 
 
The functionalities of mobile devices and apps are dependent on information stored in 
the mobile device. This information is usually closely connected to the user of the device. 
Address book, photos, videos, personal and professional mails can be some examples.2 
                                                   
1 “Understanding mobile Apps: Questions&Answers” available at 
https://www.onguardonline.gov/articles/pdf-0004-mobile-apps.pdf (accessed on 27/01/2016).   
2 Ibid. 
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Thanks to these interactions, apps and mobile devices have been an indispensable 
everyday tool.3  
 
By downloading apps we reveal information about ourselves in various ways. Initially, 
the choice of a specific application together with our activities and communications on 
the apps’ environment provides evidence on our needs and preferences. Additionally, 
applications ask permissions to access the information stored in our mobile devices and 
mobile identifiers have been developed to facilitate the tracking of the users’ activities, 
raising serious privacy concerns.4 Moreover, technology crammed into the mobile 
devices enables the constant monitoring of the location of the user. It is possible that 
this monitoring is taking place semi-secretively, when users are not well informed on 
either that the location services of the device are on or on how location data is collected 
and used. It is also possible that the monitoring takes place secretly, without any 
information having been provided to users.5 Last but not least, it has been proven by 
researches that mobile applications share information about users to third parties, 
without, often, notifying them.6 The pieces of information unveiled, or an aggregation 
of them, are not left unexploited.  
 
The majority of the mobile applications are offered for free or at a low cost. More often 
than not, mobile app developers cover the essential needs for surviving their activities 
through collaborating with advertising companies. The latter provide app developers 
with the financial means they need in return for accessing information on app users 
profiles and activities. This access can be direct, when advertising companies access 
                                                   
3 The 2015 global mobile consumer survey conducted by Deloitte reveals that consumers are 
increasingly using their mobile devices. Deloitte’s global mobile consumer survey available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-
telecommunications/articles/global-mobile-consumer-survey-us-
edition.html?id=us:2ps:3gl:gmcs:eng:tmt:120915&gclid=CjwKEAiA8qG1BRDz0tmK0pufw3QSJA
Cfn6olZTj0Gy6u0TOvtzAWssaJrNBDD0BG1wFQWcunlK4DJhoCq97w_wcB (accessed on 
27/01/2016).   
4 "What are mobile device identifiers", https://www.aerserv.com/mobile-device-
identifiers/(accessed on 19/12/2015). 
5 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on geolocation services 
on smart mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 7 
6http://techscience.org/a/2015103001/(accessed on 19/12/2015). 
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information through, for instance, tracking facilities offered in the mobile landscape, or 
indirect, when app developers share the information they collect with the advertising 
company. These information is used for tailored advertising and methods that are widely 
known as “online advertising”.7 
 
While online advertising, as being the basic source of income for app developers, plays 
an essential role on the growth of internet economy and consists a motive generating 
social and economic progress, it also raises major privacy and data protection concerns.8 
Advertisers need extensive information about their audience in order to present them 
advertisements that fall into the sphere of their interest (hereinafter “behavioural 
advertising”).9 Besides, the current technological innovations, such as big data analytics, 
facilitate the creation of profiles of internet users and thereupon offers tools of power 
and control over their life and preferences to companies offering online behavioural 
advertising services.10 As it is masterfully remarked by the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party (hereinafter “Article 29 Working Party”)11, “such practice must not be 
carried out at the expense of individual’s rights to privacy and data protection”.12  
 
                                                   
7 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising, WP 171" (2010) 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 PRIVACY COMMISSION OF BELGIUM, “Recommendation no. 04/2015 of 13 May 2015” relating 
to 1)Facebook, 2)Internet and/or Facebook users, as well as 3) users and providers of Facebook 
services, particularly plug-ins” (2015). Facebook provided to the Privacy Commission the 
following information with regard to its business model "Facebook's underlying business model 
is based on advertising. … Equally, advertisers prefer to present adverts that are relevant to their 
audience, because users respond more positively to relevant adverts, and there is less waste in 
their marketing efforts. To do this we use a variety of information about our users use of 
Facebook services in order to gauge which adverts will be of relevance." 
10 For more information see IRA RUBISTEIN, ” Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 
International Data Privacy Law” (2013) 3(2), p. 74ff.; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research 
Paper No. 12-
56,available online at http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/2/74.full.pdf+html 
11 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is an advisory body on the protection of persons 
with regard to the processing their personal data, set up by the Article 29 of the Data Protection 
Directive. It issues Opinions, Recommendations and Working documents that, despite not being 
legally binding, they are of high importance to the interpretation of the current legal framework 
connected to the processing of personal data.  
12ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising, WP 171" (2010) page 3. 
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Federal Trade’s Commission’s Staff Report of February 2014 on Mobile Privacy 
Disclosures and Transparency aptly points that, “When people use their mobile devices, 
they are sharing information about their daily lives with a multitude of players”.13 
Indeed, in the terrain of mobile applications, there are a lot of players involved; device 
and OS manufacturers, app developers/owners, app stores, third parties, such as 
advertising companies, and the end user.  
 
In its opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices, the Article 29 Working Party underlines 
the following as the main data protection risks related to mobile applications: 
 
a. The large quantities of data accessible by apps, thanks to their close interaction 
with the operating system (see Chapter 2: Actors’ technologies and findings on 
current practices).  
b. The high risk arising from “the degree of fragmentation between the many 
players in the app development landscape” (see 2.1 Actors and their 
technologies).  
c. The lack of transparency with regard to the data that are actually collected by 
the applications and an apparent trend towards data maximization.  
d. Poor security measures that may lead to unauthorized processing of personal 
data.14 
 
Furthermore, the Article 29 Working Party indicates the importance of information 
concerning the location of the mobile device on “disclosing” the “geographical 
component” of users’ activities and, subsequently, increasing the value of any other 
information collected and facilitating the formation of targeted profiles. 15 
                                                   
13FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION “Mobile Privacy Disclosures Building Trust Trough Transparency 
FTC Staff Report” (2013).1, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-
building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-
report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf. 
14ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 5. 
15ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on geolocation services 
on smart mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 3. 
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Therefore, it appears that mobile applications entail pivotal privacy and data protection 
threats. The legal community has been facing the challenge of understanding technology 
and drawing new lines to balance conflicting (apparently at least) interests. 
 
1.2 Research question 
 
The dissertation reflects on the issues related to the granting of valid consent for the 
processing of personal data on the mobile applications’ terrain under the European Data 
Protection framework and, in particular under the provisions of the Data Protection16 
and the ePrivacy Directive17. To this aim it studies the current practices related to the 
installation procedure of five of the most famous mobile applications (Facebook, Google 
Search, Google Maps, WhatsApp and Foursquare, hereinafter “the examined 
applications” or “the examined apps”), when downloaded and installed through the 
most commonly used application marketplaces (Google Play Store and App Store) on 
Android and iOS operating systems respectively. It additionally studies the Privacy Policy 
documents of these applications. It specifically evaluates the above practices and 
documents on the light of the provisions of the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directive 
for a “freely given”, “specific”,“ informed” and “unambiguous” consent of the data 
subjects for the processing of their personal data. 18 Finally, when doubts arise on the 
reconciliation of the practices with the aforementioned provisions, the dissertation 
reflects on the recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party and other Data 
Protection authorities and proposes tools for building a better compliance.   
 
                                                   
16 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Directive 95/46/ EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free 
movement of such data (1995) OJ L281/31 (23.11.1995). 
17 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Directive 
2002/58/EC, concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector (2002) OJ L202/37 (31.07.2002). 
18 Article 7(a) together with Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive and Article 5(3) of the 
ePrivacy Directive. 
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To respond to the central research question, the dissertation addresses the following 
subquestions: 
 
(a) Do the examined applications process personal data as defined in Article 2(a) of 
the Data Protection Directive? 
(b) Are the examined applications data controllers as defined in Article 2(d) of the 
Data Protection Directive? 
(c) Are the preconditions for the territorial applicability of the Data Protection 
Directive, as described in its Article 4, satisfied with regard to the examined 
applications?  
(d) Do the examined applications fall into the territorial and substantial scope of the 
ePrivacy Directive, as described in its Article 3(1)? 
(e) Does Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive, in particular, apply to the examined 
applications?  
(f) Does Article 9(3) ePrivacy Directive, in particular, apply to the processing of 
location data by the examined applications? 
 
1.3 Methodology and structure 
 
The dissertation applies the methodology of empirical legal research. It aims on 
providing an answer to a legal question having been arisen de facto during the practical 
application of law, by examining specific cases and providing specific examples. In order 
to draw a conclusion regarding the main question, each of the sub-questions are 
addressed.  
 
The assessments made are based on the examination of the current practices, as 
described above, and as well as on the study of the Privacy Policy documents of each 
one of the examined applications.  
 
The evaluated primary sources include the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directive, as 
well as EU Case Law. As far as secondary sources are concerned, given the empirical 
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nature and the aims of the research, the dissertation focuses on the opinions of the 
Article 29 Working Party. Academic legal books, articles and websites shedding light to 
technical aspects related to the problem are also examined and invoked.  
 
To start with, in Chapter 2, the dissertation notes down the procedure for downloading 
and installing the examined applications in each one of the OS and application 
marketplaces. The existing differences are examined with focus on what users are asked 
to agree to, what permissions are asked, what information is provided to users and at 
which point of the procedure. The scrutiny of the Privacy Policy and related documents 
follows, on the light of pointing out what data are collected, for what purposes, whether 
information is shared with third parties and whether opt-in and opt out techniques are 
provided. The overall structure of the documents and the information provided are 
discussed. The dissertation has adopted the terminology of the Article 29 Working Party 
on its opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices, with regard to the actors involved in 
the mobile applications terrain.19 Although this may be relevant for Facebook, 
Foursquare and WhatsApp, privacy issues related to the posts and status messages users 
share on these applications fall outside of the scope of the present research.  
 
Focus shifts in Chapter 3 on the presentation of the legal framework provided by the 
Data Protection and ePrivacy Directive. Not all the provisions of the aforementioned 
Directives are examined, but only those needed to answer the research question and 
subquestions. The legal findings will be supported by Case Law and investigations by 
national data protection authorities, where necessary. 
 
In Chapter 4 the dissertation assesses the findings of Chapter 2 under the legal 
provisions elaborated in Chapter 3 and, in particular, under the requirements stipulated 
on the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directive with regard to a “freely given” , 
“specific”,“ informed” and “unambiguous” consent of the data subjects for the 
processing of their personal data. When doubts arise on the conformity of the practices 
with the aforementioned provisions, the dissertation presents the recommendations of 
                                                   
19 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, WP 
202" (2013) 9. 
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the Article 29 Working Party and other Data Protection authorities, and proposes tools 
for building a better compliance. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 entails the conclusions of the research. 
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Chapter 2: Actors’ technologies and findings on current 
practices 
Players in the mobile applications terrain, accordingly to their technologies, adopt 
various practices on providing users with information on what data the applications 
access and for what purposes.  Chapter 2 presents the technical aspects and the findings 
of the research. 
 
2.1 Actors and their technologies 
 
Device and operating system manufacturers, applications marketplaces, application 
developers and third parties are the four building blocks in the arena of mobile 
applications. They are intertwined and the practices of each one of them may affect the 
others. 
 
2.1.1 The device and OS manufacturers 
 
Mobile devices need an operating system in order to be functional. The operating 
system (hereinafter "OS") is a software, compatible with the hardware, which triggers 
the facilities of the device. One of the greatest functionalities of the OS is the 
administration of the applications running on the device. Applications need to 
“communicate” with the operating system in order to function and this becomes 
possible through the application programming interfaces (APIs). APIs are inherent in 
mobile devices and enable apps to access data stored in the device or generated by it, 
as well as sensors crammed into the device. These sensors (gyroscope, digital compass, 
accelerometer, front and rear cameras etc) enable the detection of the location of the 
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user. 20In this way, app developers are able to read the devices and apps’ history, users’ 
identity, detect their location, take pictures and much more.  
 
At the time being there are a lot of companies manufacturing smart mobile devices (iOS, 
Samsung, Nokia, Sony etc) and four basic mobile operating systems; Android, iOS, 
Windows Phone and Blackberry OS. The majority of the device manufacturers 
implement Android OS, while iPhones and iPads share the same owner with iOS, Apple, 
and are always designed to operate under it. 
 
Applications in Android and iOS run in a sandbox, an isolated area of the system that 
does not have access to the rest of the resources, unless access permissions are explicitly 
granted by the user. Application developers decide on the permissions to be asked by 
the user and the OS together with the application marketplace are basically responsible 
for the way information on the permissions asked is provided to end users. 
 
Additionally, the hardware together with the OS are responsible for creating the privacy 
settings of the device and enable users to control whether and what categories of their 
personal data are accessed and processed by the apps.  
 
2.1.2 Application marketplaces 
 
Application marketplaces are the distributors of the applications. Upon request by the 
user, they offer the software of the application that is subsequently installed in the 
mobile device. The most broadly used operating systems are very closely connected to 
a particular app store. Google Play store is the primary and official application store, pre-
installed on most Android devices, and App Store is the unique pre-installed marketplace 
platform for iOS mobiles and tablets.  
 
                                                   
20ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 4. 
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As explained above, application marketplaces are involved in the permissions requesting 
system and as the Article 29 Working Party has aptly observed, “App stores are in an 
important position to enable app developers to deliver adequate information about the 
app, including the types of data the app is able to process and for what 
purposes.”21Therefore, application marketplaces, are, without a doubt a key actor linked 
to the privacy concerns in the mobile applications terrain.  
 
2.1.3 Application developers/owners 
 
As described above, applications are software designed by app developers who work 
independently or as part of a company. The dissertation has adopted the terminology 
of the Article 29 Working party 22 and it is necessary to clarify that the use of the term 
“app developers” refers to the programmers and technical developers of mobile 
applications as well as the companies and organizations who request the development 
of an application and “determine its purposes”.23 
 
2.1.4 Third parties 
 
Undertakings or natural persons that have access to data through the application that 
the user has downloaded, or with whom the app developers share personal information 
of the users are called third parties.  
 
                                                   
21ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 12. 
22ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 9. 
23 Ibid. 
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Third parties may be advertising networks, intermediaries, other entities providing the 
app developers with analytics and communication services, or entities processing data 
and offering services on behalf of the data controller.24 
 
2.2 Method of approach-research strategy 
 
The research is conducted on Nexus 7 mobile device with Android OS version 6.0.1 and 
on iPhone 5 with iOS 9.2 version (see Figure 2 Nexus 7 mobile device on which the research was 
conducted and Figure 3Figure 1 iPhone 5 on which the research was conducted on Appendix). 
 
First and foremost, two different operating systems are chosen with the aim of 
indicating how possible differences with regard to the practices adopted may reflect on 
the legal assessment. Android and iOS are selected as ranked first in popularity.25 The 
same goes with the examined applications. Different practices may lead to different 
legal assessment. Facebook, Google Search, Google Maps, Foursquare and WhatsApp 
are examined and the selection is a result of their popularity and as well as of the 
particular characteristics of each one of them. Privacy concerns surfaced on some of 
them also affected the final selection. 26 
 
Facebook is the most famous social networking service. More than one billion users have 
downloaded the Facebook application through the Google Play Store27. Serious privacy 
issues have been raised around the huge quantity of users’ information that the service 
has access to and the way it has been processing it. Google Search is the most widely 
                                                   
24ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 12,13. 
25 In 2015, Android dominated the smartphone market share with a percentage of 82.8% 
followed by iOS with a percentage of 13.9%. Samsung has been the leader in the worldwide 
smartphone market reaching a 21, 4% share in 2015, followed by Apple (13,9% of the market 
share). Based on data of the International Data Corporation, "Smartphone OS Market Share, 
2015 Q2", http://www.idc.com/prodserv/smartphone-os-market-share.jsp (accessed 
25/11/2015). 
26 For more information on Facebook privacy concerns among others see MARK WEINSTEIN, "Is 
privacy dead?",http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weinstein/internet-
privacy_b_3140457.html, accessed on 06/01/2016)  
27 Based on the information provided on the Facebook’s page on Google Play store 
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used web search engine on the World Wide Web28 and it is owned by Google Inc. that 
also owns Google Maps. Google Maps belongs among the most popular location based 
services.29 Its mobile application version uses the location tracking facilities of the 
mobile device to provide navigation, traffic report and other relevant services. 
Foursquare mobile application offers a location based service as well, providing 
recommendations for worth visiting places around the current location of the user, 
based on the preferences that the user has shared with the application. WhatsApp is an 
instant messaging mobile application. The app has been “one of the world’s top five best-
selling apps” according to the Dutch Data Protection Authority that, in collaboration 
with the Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada, investigated WhatsApp for issues 
relating to (among other) access by the application to the address book of the users.30  
 
The dissertation focuses on the examination and assessment of the consent related 
issues. To this view, particular emphasis is paid on the practices of the apps’ 
marketplaces and the examined apps; however, the architecture of the mobile devices, 
as described above, and the interrelationship between device, OS, apps marketplace 
and apps requires that light is also shed on the practices of the rest of the actors, and 
the issues arising are approached spherically. The research is carried out as follows; all 
five applications are downloaded both form Google Play Store and App Store. The 
permissions that each app requests from users in order to access data stored in the 
device are noted down. The differences between the two OS and application 
marketplaces are observed with regard to the information provided to users, as well as 
                                                   
28 Based on Alexa, 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Computers/Internet/Searching/Search_Engines, 
(accessed on 26/12/2015). 
29 COLLETE CUIJPERS AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “How fragmentation in European law undermines 
consumer protection:the case of location-bases services” (2008) 33 European Law Review 886. 
According to the authors, location based services “are services based on location information 
(….) can be delivered by means of wireless systems and unique identification of communication 
devices, combined with location data(….) use different types of techniques that process location 
data in various ways.”  
30 DUTCH DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY, “ Investigation into the processing of personal data 
for the ‘whatsapp’ mobile application by WhatsApp Inc., Report on the definitive findings, 
January 2013” (2013) 25, 26 available at : 
https://cbpweb.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/mijn_privacy/rap_2013-whatsapp-dutchdpa-
final-findings-en.pdf 
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to the privacy settings each operating system has developed. Where appropriate, 
references are provided to the Appendix of the dissertation, where screenshots 
(Figures) from the research are presented. Following, the Privacy Policy and related 
documents of each application are scrutinized to puzzle out what data each application 
collects, whether location data are collected, for what purposes and if it is shared with 
third parties. These practices are assessed in Chapter 3 under the light of the Data 
Protection and ePrivacy Directive and the guidelines given by the Article 29 Working 
Party and other data protection authorities to the players on mobile applications’ arena. 
 
2.3 Current Practices 
 
2.3.1 Giving permissions 
 
As explained above, the majority of the applications need access to personal data stored 
in the device in order to function or share it for advertising purposes; however this 
access is not possible unless the user gives permission ( see 2.1.1 The device and OS 
manufacturers ). Both Android and iOS have been criticized for their permissions 
granting systems and the sufficiency of the information provided in the application 
stores and during the installation procedure31. The latest versions, Android 
Marshmallow 6.0 and iOS 9 present the following characteristics: 
 
 Android Marshmallow 6.0 iOS 9 versions 
Links to legal documents 
presented to users before 
installation. 
 Link to the Privacy Policy 
of the application 
developer. 
 Link to the Privacy Policy 
of the application 
developer. 
                                                   
31 NICK MEDIATI, “ Android Marshmallow vs. iOS9: Which has the better app permissions 
system?” available at http://www.greenbot.com/article/3005331/android/android-
marshmallow-vs-ios-9-which-has-the-better-app-permissions-system.html (accessed on 
06/02/2016). 
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Link to the permissions 
that the application 
requests. (see Figure 2 
Available information on Google 
Play Store on Appendix) 
 
Both are presented at the 
bottom of the application’s 
page on Google Play Store 
If users click on the 
permissions link a pop-up 
window is presented 
where information on the 
permissions that the app 
requests is provided(see 
Figure 3 Permissions’ details 
pop-up window on Google Play 
Store on Appendix).  
 
 
 
It is presented at the 
bottom of the 
application’s page on App 
Store. 
Time when permissions 
are asked. 
When the app actually 
needs to use the specific 
feature or information (see 
an example on Figure 4 New 
permissions’ system on Android 
Marshmallow 6.0.1 andFigure 5 
Facebook mobile app asking for 
permissions on Android 
Marshmallow 6.0.1 on 
Appendix).  
When the app actually 
needs to use the specific 
feature or information (see 
an example on Figure 6 
Facebook mobile app asking for 
permissions on iOS 9.2 and 
Figure 7 Facebook mobile app 
asking access to location 
services on iOS 9.2 on 
Appendix).  
Information given about 
the reason why each 
permission is asked 
It is usually not presented 
It depends on the 
information that the app 
developer has provided to 
the permissions granting 
It is presented when each 
permission is asked 
(see an example on the same 
Figures as above). 
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system 32 (see an example on 
the same Figures as above) 
Enabling users’ control  Through the Settings users 
can control which 
applications have access to 
which category of data and 
can change their choices 
whenever they decide to 
(see Figure 10 Location 
permissions on Android 
Marshmallow 6.0.1 and Figure 
11 Google Maps Application 
permissions ion Android 
Marshmallow 6.0.1 on 
Appendix). 
Through the Settings users 
can control which 
applications have access to 
which category of data and 
can change their choices 
whenever they decide to 
(see Figure 8 Privacy Settings of 
iOS 9.2 and Figure 9 Settings of 
iOS 9.2 on Appendix). 
Table 1 Installation procedure-Permisions-Information asked 
 
Android Marshmallow 6.0 launched a significant change to the permissions granting 
system compared to the previous versions (see Figure 4 New permissions’ system on Android 
Marshmallow 6.0.1 on Appendix). The “all or nothing system”, where users were asked, 
before installing the application, to grant all permissions that the application were 
asking for otherwise they could not download it, has been abandoned and presently, 
users can grant only the specific permissions they want, similarly to iOS. 33Additionally, 
unlike the previous versions, Android Marshmallow 6.0 enable users to control which 
applications have access to each specific category of data and change the settings 
whenever they decide to again similarly to iOS (see examples on Figure 8 Privacy Settings of iOS 
9.2 and Figure 10 Location permissions on Android Marshmallow 6.0.1 and Figure 11 Google Maps 
                                                   
32 This information is provided by the app developers and not by the app store; therefore it is 
possible that some applications do not explain the reason why they ask for each permission. 
33http://www.androidcentral.com/how-take-advantage-new-app-permissions-
marshmallow(accessed on 26/12/2015) 
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Application permissions ion Android Marshmallow 6.0.1 on Appendix). 34 IOS latest versions have 
included links to the Privacy Policy documents of the app developers.  
 
For Android OS, applications have to be developed in a language that has complete 
access to Android APIs. Respectively, for iOS, applications have to be developed with 
Apple's iOS SDK.35 Google Play Store and App Store has created several groups of 
permissions that an application can ask from the user. Each permissions group includes 
several information that the application is granted to access and some actions that the 
application is granted to perform. Those permission groups are more on Android 
Explanations on what each group of permissions entails are provided by Google in its 
Help Centre, but not by Apple. In its description for some groups of permissions Google 
Play Store warns users of potential harmful consequences from the use of a malicious 
application. Permission groups may be modified or reclassified over time. Unlike Google 
Play Store, App Store asks users to enter their Apple ID and password in order to 
download and install an application; however users can change this setting. Automatic 
updates are usually by default turned on for both OS and stores36; nonetheless, users 
can opt to turn them off.37 
 
                                                   
34Unfortunately, not all apps available on the Google Play Store are designed for the new 
operating system of Android and have not implemented the new permissions system yet. As a 
result, for those applications users still need to follow the “all or nothing system”. 
35 In order to be launched on Google Play Store and App store apps must follow their policies. 
The reason behind that is security. Application marketplaces need to protect their customers 
from malware and applications “hiding” illegal activities, like promotion of violence and bullying. 
Applications that are infringing these policies are removed. 
36Google Play Developer Programme Policies, 
https://play.google.com/intl/ALL_uk/about/developer-content-policy.html (accessed on 
31/01/2016) 
Apple Store Review Guidelines, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#terms-
conditions (accessed on 31/01/2016) 
37 Google Help Centre states that if the update of the application needs access to permissions 
that are part of a permission group that the user has already accepted, he/she will receive no 
notification asking for approval for the new permission. It is considered as already approved. If 
the permission needed is part a permissions group that the user has not given its approval for, 
he/she will be asked to accept the update, despite of the fact that automatic updates are turned 
on. https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/6014972?p=app_permissions&rd=1  
(accessed on 01/02/2016). 
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Location based services such as Google Maps and Foursquare cannot (fully) run if the 
location services of the mobile device are off. When needed, the apps ask permission 
for turning on the location services. For Android, on the poping-up window, asking for 
permission, the user can click on the option “Learn more” and the Help Centre provide 
information on how Android OS and Google Play Store have developed location settings 
and permissions.  
 
Google Search and Google Maps apps are usually preinstalled on Android OS devices 
and permissions are granted automatically by the OS to them. Users have several 
options, including forcing them to stop, uninstall updates (but not the application) and 
disable them. Users can always enable them again and use them only by filling in a box 
that they agree with the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy document of the app, 
without having been asked to give any permission. 
 
2.3.2 Privacy Policies and related documents 
 
Privacy Policies are part of the legal documents accompanying a mobile application. 
They have been developed on the line of compliance with legal obligations protecting 
privacy online, part of which is the obligation of the entities collecting data online to 
provide the data subject with some information about the data processing.38Most of the 
times, Privacy Policies consist part of the Terms of Use of the application. Their 
contractual nature has been disputed and it is still a grey area.39 
 
Following, the table presents the information collected by each one of the five mobile 
applications that the dissertation examines. All the information provided on the tables 
is based on the Privacy Policy and related documents of each of the applications.40 The 
                                                   
38 Different names can be given to Privacy Policy documents. For instance, Facebook names the 
relevant legal document as “Data Policy” while WhatsApp names it "Privacy Notice". 
39See Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Contractual Nature of Online Policies Remains 
Unsettled (2010) 244 New York Law Journal, and Allyson W, Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: 
Contracting Away Control over Personal Information? (2007) 111 Penn State Law Review.  
40Data Policy of Facebook, available at https://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation 
(accessed on 31/01/2016) 
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data collected have been categorized by the author and it is possible that some of the 
particular examples included in each category does not refer to all the applications that 
access the general category. Emphasis has been put on the information that the author 
considered as collectable though the mobile applications and not through the “on 
browser” versions of the services. Given that Google Search and Google Maps share the 
same Privacy Policy document, they are examined in a unified category named as 
“Google Services”. 
 
Information collected  Facebook Google 
Services 
Foursquare WhatsApp 
Identity of the data 
subject, e-mail, telephone 
number, credit card and 
payment data, photos 
(Those data are generally 
named by the examined 
apps as "information 
provided by the user in 
order to use the services”)  
    (only telephone 
number) 
Date and duration of 
accessing the apps, 
browsing history, 
interaction with 
advertisements, 
information 
    
                                                   
Privacy Policy of Google, available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
(accessed on 31/01/2016) 
Privacy Policy of Foursquare, available at https://foursquare.com/legal/privacy   (accessed on 
31/01/2016) 
Privacy Notice of WhatsApp, available at https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/?l=en (accessed on 
31/01/2016) 
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communicated with 
others, address book  
(Those data are generally 
named by the examined 
apps as ”Information 
collected when the user 
uses the application”) 
Information about the 
device and operating 
system, unique mobile 
identifiers, language, time 
zone, IP address. 
    
Location information, like 
GPS signals 
    
Information on or about 
the content the user 
provides, such as the 
location of a photo, or the 
date a file was created and 
information about the user 
provided by other users 
    
Information about users 
and their activities on and 
off the application. 
    
Information generated 
through cookies or similar 
technologies that 
applications use to identify 
the device. 
    
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Information on entries, 
submissions, views, 
content. 
    
Table 2 Information collected by the applications based on their Privacy Policy 
documents 
 
In their privacy policies, the application developers also enunciate the purposes of the 
processing of personal data. Based on the findings all five apps collect data for the 
purposes of: 
 
(a) providing, improving and developing services,  
(b) communicating with the user about the services, terms and policies and sending 
them marketing communications, 
(c) verifying accounts and activity, promoting safety and security, 
(d) showing relevant ads and measuring their effectiveness (except WhatsApp). 
 
The examined apps share information that they collect with third parties that also 
process it, either for the provision of the service, on behalf of the application developer, 
or for advertising and measurement purposes.  
 
The structure of the Privacy Policy and related documents and the way users are 
provided with information about the collection of their personal data is of tantamount 
importance to the substance of the information provided.  
 
Google’s Privacy Policy is part of Google’s Privacy&Terms document.41 The document is 
not long. For key terms on the text, users can put the mouse on them and read examples 
and further explanations in a pop-up window. In case users want to learn more, they 
can click on the pop-up window.  Apart  from the Privacy Policy document, information 
on the data processing policies of Google are also provided in other links and pages, 
                                                   
41Google Privacy &Terms, available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
(accessed on 31/01/2016) 
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both on Google’s Privacy&Terms page and other hyperlinks run by Google such as the 
Google Public Policy blog and the Google Blog.42 
 
Similarly to Google Services, information on data processing by Facebook can be found 
not only in Facebook’s Data Policy but also in other links, like Facebook’s Cookies Policy 
and Help Centre. At some points, the Data Policy document presents links on which the 
user can click and get further information.  
 
Foursquare presents a summary of its privacy policy on “Privacy 101” page as well as a 
set of frequently asked questions related to privacy on a different link. WhatsApp’s 
Privacy Notice is brief and does not include any link to other pages. 
 
Facebook offers the possibility to its users to opt-out from seeing on-line interest based 
ads.43 Google also offers opting-out of interest based ads served by Google. Foursquare 
and WhatsApp does not offer any opt-out possibilities. Users can always opt out though 
initiatives like Your online Choices, an initiative of online advertising agencies that, 
though a website, provide information on online behavioural advertising and the opt-
out possibility. 44 
                                                   
42 Google Public Policy Blogspot, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.nl/ (accessed on 31/01/2016) 
Google Official Blog, https://googleblog.blogspot.nl/(accessed on 31/01/2016) 
43 Facebook Help Centre, https://www.facebook.com/help/164968693837950 (accessed on 
28/01/2016).  
44 http://www.youronlinechoices.eu/  
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Chapter 3: The European Union’s legal arsenal 
In the legal terrain, the European lawmakers, the Data Protection Authorities and 
generally the legal community faced the necessity of unraveling and understanding the 
technological mysteries and of reacting to the new challenges. How is the right to privacy 
understood towards the reality of smart mobile devices and mobile applications? Are 
the existing legal arsenal a shield against inroads in users ‘privacy? The present Chapter 
aspires to address these thorny issues. 
3.1. The right to privacy and data protection on mobile 
applications terrain 
 
Globally, the majority of the democratic societies officially recognize the right of 
individuals to enjoy an area of privacy. 45 That area encompasses the right of individuals 
to keep secret parts of their lives, as well as their personal communications and 
information. From the wide span of the concept of the right to privacy and data 
protection, the dissertation presents only the lines that connect the mobile applications 
ecosystem with the privacy and data protection concerns. 
 
Along the understanding of the right of a person to enjoy a private area, many 
parameters have been understood and conceptualized as the right to privacy. It has 
been shortly defined as "the right to be let alone" by Warren and Brandeis46, while Roger 
Clarke writes that "Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining a personal 
space, free from interference from other people and organizations". 47 
 
                                                   
45 See USA Privacy Act (1974), Open Democracy Act in South Africa (1996), Privacy Charter of 
Australia 1994. 
46  Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The right to privacy” (1890) 4 HAR.L.REV. 193,220, 
available at http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-
/faculty/debaron/582/582%20readings/right%20to%20privacy.pdf   
47 Roger Clarke “Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of terms” 
available at http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-
/faculty/debaron/582/582%20readings/right%20to%20privacy.pdf  
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As a part of the right to privacy, many legal orders recognize the right of individuals to 
control what information about them is communicated to other people. This idea has 
been conceptualized with the term “informational self-determination".48 In this way, 
individuals can protect their privacy in a world where the possibility of collecting and 
processing personal information has been multiplied. 49  
 
Mobile devices consist a “place” on which part of the private life of the users dwells and 
falls into the sphere of privacy protection exactly for that reason. It has been argued that 
mobile devices reality "has given birth" to a new perception of the right to privacy that 
could be understood as " the right to have at disposal a terminal programmed by default 
to minimize the data sent and received to the strict minimum needed for achieving the 
purposes pursued by its user."50Justice John Roberts, member of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in the ruling on the case Riley v. California on warrantless search of 
digital information on mobile phones51  stated that "Modern cell phones are not just 
another one technological convenience, with all they contain and all they may reveal 
they hold for many Americans "the privacies of life". Modern technologies hide 
important threats for the private lives of individuals. The architecture of mobile devices, 
together with their utility make them more vulnerable towards "attacks against 
                                                   
48 This term was first used in 1983 by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the context of 
a ruling concerning the collection of personal information. The court ruled that "(… ) in the 
context of modern data processing, the protection of the individuals against unlimited collection, 
storage, use and disclosure of his/her personal data is encompassed by the general rights of the 
German constitution". These rights entrench for individuals the right to control all the 
information about them. VerfG, Urteil v. 15. Dezember 1983, Az. 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 
440, 484/83. 
49  In its article “A taxonomy of privacy",   Daniel Solove categorized the activities that affect 
privacy. The first group of activities involves information collection. The second, the information 
processing. Two means of information processing can be the aggregation of information and the 
identification, meaning the linking of information to a particular individual. Data may also be 
processed, when it is provided for secondary use, videlicet the use of information for a different 
reason to which it was initially collected, without the data subject’s consent. The third group, 
consist of activities of dissemination of information. ”Information dissemination activities all 
involve the spreading or transfer of personal data”. Finally, the fourth group, comprises activities 
that invade into peoples’ private affairs.   
50 SERGE GUTWIRTH, YVES POULLET AND PAUL DE HERT, "Data Protection in a Profiled World” ( 
Springer 2010)  27 
51 SOUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Riley v.California 573 US.(2014) 
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privacy". A proper understanding of the threats is of utmost importance for the creation 
of a legal arsenal, effective in the specific circumstances and needs.  
 
3.2 The EU legal framework  
 
In the context of the legal order and academic research in the European Union, there is 
a tendency to treat data protection issues as part of the right to privacy52, despite the 
fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes an 
autonomous right for the protection of personal data in Article 8, separate from the 
right to private life that is established in Article 7.53 Along this line, the European 
lawmaker enacted the Data Protection Directive. 
 
Moreover, the European Union’s legislative bodies have considered as necessary to 
enact a supplementary to the Data Protection Directive legal framework for the sector 
of electronic communications. The ePrivacy Directive is the successor to the 
Telecommunications Data Protection Directive and consists part of a large set of 
directives regulating the sector of electronic communications. The ePrivacy directive 
consists lex specialis to the lex generalis Data Protection Directive. The latter applies to 
the processing of personal data unless there is a provision in the first that indicates its 
own applicability.54 
 
                                                   
52 PURTOVA, NADEZHDA, Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to 
Privacy, and Waiver of Data Protection Rights (2010) 28 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
179-198  available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555875 
53 Article 7 of the EU Charter stipulates that “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications” while Article 8 of the same Charter states “1. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data 
must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”. 
54COLLETE CUIJPERS AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “How fragmentation in European law undermines 
consumer protection: the case of location-bases services” (2008) 33 European Law Review 886 
and according to Article 1(2) ePrivacy Directive 9 "The provision of this Directive particularize 
and complement Directive 95/46/EC for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1. 
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In the European Union's area, the Data Protection Directive constitutes a text-reference 
for the protection of personal data of the users and, internationally, it has been an 
example of high data protection standards. However, both the Data Protection and the 
ePrivacy Directives were adopted long ago, when the internet was quite different 
compared to its dimensions nowadays, and mobile applications did not exist at all.55 
Currently, a General Data Protection Regulation that is going to succeed the Data 
Protection Directive is under negotiations between the EU legislative bodies. Given that 
the General Data Protection Regulation is expected to enter into force in spring 201856, 
the dissertation evolves on the legal framework formed by the Data Protection 
Directive. 
 
3.3 Elaboration on the legal framework and assessment  
 
The need for a thorough understanding of all the notions encompassed in the Data 
Protection and ePrivacy Directives is inescapable if the players in the field of mobile 
applications attempt to adopt a legally compliant behavior; nonetheless, the 
dissertation limits its focus on the study of the necessary notions for reaching 
conclusions on the research question and subquestions. The notions of “processing of 
personal data”, “personal data”, “data controller”, “establishment of the controller”, 
and “means of processing information” will shed light on whether the Data Protection 
and ePrivacy Directives are applicable and the requirements for a valid consent, 
stipulated on their provisions, should be respected by the developers of the examined 
applications.  
 
3.3.1. The concepts of “processing”,"personal data" and "data controller" 
 
                                                   
55 SERGE GUTWIRTH, YVES POULLET AND PAUL DE HERT, "Data Protection in a Profiled World” ( 
Springer 2010)  8 
56Based on information on the official press of Council of the European Union available at  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/18-data-protection/  ( 
accessed on 29/01/2016). 
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The conceptual limitations and therefore the applicability of the Data Protection 
Directive are mapped in its Article 2. In the scope of our research, those definitions are 
determinative in figuring out, whether the European legal framework is applicable when 
Facebook, Google, WhatsApp and Foursquare process personal data of their users.  
 
In accordance with Article 2(b) Data Protection Directive “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data” equals with “processing of personal 
data”.57 
 
Article 2 (a) Data Protection Directive stipulates that 
 
 “personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity”. 58 
 
Recital 26 of the Directive declares that, 
 
"To determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means 
likely reasonably to be used by the controller or by another person to identify the said 
person .....”.59 
 
Nowadays, identification and identifiability are easily achievable, with the aid of the 
latest technologies. The information stored in the mobile devices are related either to 
owner of the device or to another individual (data subject) 60. Users usually "sing in" the 
                                                   
57 Article 2 (d) Data Protection Directive “processing of personal data (“processing”) shall mean 
any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”. 
58 Article 2(a) Data Protection Directive. 
59 Recital 26 Data Protection Directive. 
60 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 12, 13. 
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features of their devices by providing their names and e-mail accounts and tend to share 
more and more information online about themselves and their friends.61 Therefore, one 
may conclude that many types of data stored in mobile devices are related to an 
identified or identifiable person.62   
 
In its report on the definitive findings on the investigation into the processing of personal 
data for the WhatsApp mobile application, the Dutch Data Protection authority stated 
that, 
 
 “As far as whasapp users are concerned, WhatsApp has at least their mobile phone 
numbers at its disposal…..The mobile phone number is a personal data item because it 
is direct contact data item that anyone can use to identify a person directly or indirectly 
by taking intermediate steps. In addition, WhatsApp also has at its disposal the unique 
IMSI customer number, the unique IMEI device number or the MAC address of the iPhone 
of whatsapp users. Without disproportionate effort, WhatsApp can link the data items 
to each other or, if necessary, take intermediate steps to trace the data subjects". 63 
 
The natural or legal person that decides for the purposes and means of the processing 
is named “data controller” (Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Directive)64. This 
                                                   
61 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on geolocation services 
on smart mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 10. 
62 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 8. 
63 DUTCH DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY, “ Investigation into the processing of personal data 
for the ‘whatsapp’ mobile application by WhatsApp Inc., Report on the definitive findings, 
January 2013” (2013) 25, 26 available at : 
https://cbpweb.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/mijn_privacy/rap_2013-whatsapp-dutchdpa-
final-findings-en.pdf 
64Article 2(d) Data Protection Directive “'controller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are 
determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria 
for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law;”. 
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determinative role holds one more high responsibility. That of the compliance with the 
data protection rules. 65   
 
Assessment 
 
In view of the above and based on the findings (see 2.3.2 Privacy Policies and related 
documents), the examined apps (among other) access, collect, use and transfer, 
therefore process, under Article 2(b) Data Protection Directive, information that can 
identify a natural person and, subsequently, is considered as personal data under Article 
2(a) of the Data Protection Directive.  
 
It is worth underlining that despite the fact that Facebook, Foursquare and WhatsApp 
state what they consider as personal data in their Privacy Policies, the applicability of 
the law is determined by the definition of Article 2 (a) of the Data Protection Directive 
and not by what each application developer considers as personal data.  
 
Besides, the developers of the examined mobile apps are qualified as data controllers, 
as in their Privacy Policies, they determine the means and purposes of collection and 
processing of users' personal information.  
 
3.3.2 Applicability of the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directives by the 
device and OS manufacturers and app developers  
 
As long as the five examined applications process personal information of their users 
and qualify as data controllers the applicability of the Data Protection and ePrivacy 
Directives can be examined. 
                                                   
65 For instance, Article 6(2) of the Data Protection Directive on the principles relating to data 
quality, clearly states that “it shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied 
with.”  
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3.3.2.1 The Data Protection Directive  
 
In the context of our research, the fact that data subjects may reside in the territory of 
a state different to the residence of the data controller creates an element of 
international law that has to be spelled out.  
 
According to Article 4 (1) Data Protection Directive,  
 
“Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this 
Directive to the processing of personal data where: 
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the 
controller on the territory of the Member State;  
(......) 
( c ) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of 
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on 
the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for the 
purposes of transit through the territory of the Community”.66 
 
To begin with, it is worth mentioning that the protection afforded by the Article 4 of the 
Data Protection Directive is irrespective of the nationality of the data subject.67 The 
determinative factor is the location of the processing equipment on the territory of a 
European Member State. 68  
 
                                                   
66 Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive under the title “National applicable law”. 
67 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Working document on determining the 
international application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet 
by non-EU based web sites 5035/01/EN/Final WP ” 7. 
68 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY “Recommendation 2/2001 on certain 
minimum requirements for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union 
5020/01/EN/Final WP 43”3 and LOKKE MOEREL “The long arm of the EU data protection law: 
Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by 
websites worldwide?” (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law. The author underlines also that 
Article 4.(1)(.c) of the Data Protection Directive applies also when the controller has 
establishments in the EU but its activities are unrelated to the processing of personal data. 
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As far as the subparagraph a, is concerned, the criteria that have to be examined-fulfilled 
are:  
(a) Whether the data controller has an establishment in the territory of one of the 
member states. 
(b) and whether the processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the 
activities of that establishment.  
 
The notion of “establishment” has been a grey area and has been probed many times 
by the European Court of Justice, in the context of various cases.69 Recital 19of the Data 
Protection Directive provides the explanation that “(...)establishment on the territory of 
a Member State implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements;(...)the legal form of such an establishment (...) is not the determining 
factor in this respect”70.  
 
For the second requirement to be addressed, the processing of personal data should be 
performed as part of the activities of the establishment of the controller in the territory 
of a Member State. The Article 29 Working Party has argued that three are the criteria 
that have to be comprehended and examined in each specific case; the nature of the 
establishment and whether it encompasses processing of personal data activities, the 
degree of the involvement of the establishment in the processing of personal data 
activities and, finally, the basic objective of the Directive that is the “effective protection 
of individuals”71 towards the processing of their personal data and that shall be taken 
into consideration as well.72 
 
                                                   
69 CJEU C-33/78 Sinifar SA v Saae-Ferngas AG (1978) ECR 02183, “ the concept of branch, agency 
or other establishment implies a place of business which has the appearance of permanency, 
such as the extension of a parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to 
negotiate business with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if 
necessary be a legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have 
to deal directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of business 
constituting the extension”. 
70 Recital 19 Data Protection Directive. 
71 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law WP 
179”14. 
72 Ibid. 
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For data controllers that do not have establishments in the territory of the European 
Union, subparagraph (a) cannot be applied. This entails the risk that data subjects in the 
territory of the European Union may be left unprotected. It might be easy and 
convenient for data controllers to reside outside of the EU and being absolved by the 
obligations the EU data protection law stipulates. The EU law maker needed to find a 
new connecting factor to subject data controllers residing in a third country to the 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive73 and avert the circumvention of the law.74  
The equipment used by the data controller for the processing activities was selected as 
the connecting factor and consists a “physical link between the action (of processing)  
and (the territory of a Member State and its) legal system”. 75  
 
It must be pointed out that the word “equipment” used in the English version of Article 
4(c) is different to that used in the other languages’ versions.76 The respective words in 
the versions of the Directive for the majority of the Member States is more similar to 
the English word “means”. On the semantic conflict that arises, the Article 29 Working 
Party has argued that the word “equipment” should be understood as “means”.77 
 
Additionally, in order for Article 4(c) to be applicable, it is necessary that the data 
controller exercise control over the equipment as far as the collection and processing of 
data is concerned. The necessary control is satisfied when the data controller 
determines the way in which the equipment works and decides on the data collected 
                                                   
73 In its decision C-131/12 Google Spain and INC v. Agencia Espanola de proteccion de datos and 
Mario Costeja Gonzalez, the Court states that the objective of the European Union legislation is 
to prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection guaranteed by the Directive and if 
we limit the territorial scope of the directive, this protection will be circumvented.  
74 Recital 20 of the Data Protection Directive states that “the fact that the processing of data is 
carried out by a person established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection 
of individuals provided for in this Directive”. 
75 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Working document on determining the 
international application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet 
by non-EU based web sites WP 56 ” 7. 
76ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law WP 179” 
20 
77 ibid 
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and the purposes of the processing. The ownership of the equipment does not affect 
the control that may be exercised by the data controller over it. 78  
 
The Article 29 Working Party has accepted that mobile devices satisfy the requirements 
of the notion of "means" under Article 4(c ) of the DPD,  “since the device is instrumental 
in the processing of personal data from and about the user,.. “79; nevertheless, it stresses 
that the assessment can be different when data are processed only locally, at the device 
80 Besides, in its report on the definite findings, the Dutch DPA asserts that WhatsApp 
uses the smartphones as a means of processing personal data” and accentuates that 
both the Data Protection and the ePrivacy Directive is imperative law. Unilateral 
declaration in the Privacy Policy of an application, even if it can be considered as 
accepted by the users, cannot exempt its application. 81 
 
Assessment 
 
In accordance with the Privacy Policies of the examined data controllers, Facebook Inc.82 
has headquarters both in the USA and in Europe (In Dublin, Ireland), while Google, 
WhatsApp and Foursquare have headquarters only in the USA. Facebook and Google 
also own national companies established in several European countries.83  
                                                   
78 ibid 
79 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 7 and ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on 
geolocation services on smart mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 12. However, LOKKE MOEREL 
“The long arm of the EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to 
processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?” (2011) 1 International Data 
Privacy Law 38. The author argues that personal computers does not constitute “equipment 
situated within the EU”. He claims that “The personal computer of a user is under the control of 
the user rather than of the website. The website therefore does not actively “make use of 
equipment to collect data”  
80 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law WP 179” 
20. 
81 Dutch Data Protection Authority, “ Investigation into the processing of personal data for the 
‘whatsapp’ mobile application by WhatsApp Inc., Report on the definitive findings January 2013” 
(2013) 20, available at : 
https://cbpweb.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/mijn_privacy/rap_2013-whatsapp-dutchdpa-
final-findings-en.pdf 
82 Facebook Inc. is the developer of the Facebook app. 
83 Google Company Locations, https://www.google.com/about/company/facts/locations  
(accessed on 31/01/2016) 
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In the field of corporate law, headquarters are usually considered as the head offices of 
a company that are responsible for its overall management.84 The headquarters of 
Facebook are stable arrangements in the territory of Dublin. In its Privacy Policy, 
Facebook states that Facebook Ireland Ltd is the data controller responsible for the 
processing activities outside USA and Canada The two requirements for the applicability 
of Article 4(a) of the Data Protection Directive seem to be satisfied and one may 
conclude that the Data Protection Directive is applicable by Facebook Irelands Ltd when 
it processes personal information of its users.  
 
In its own initiative recommendation to Facebook, the Privacy Commission of Belgium 
reasons that Facebook Ireland cannot qualify as the only data controller for the 
processing of personal data of Belgian users. Facebook Inc. and not Facebook Ireland 
determines the means and purposes of processing personal data. It bases this argument 
on the details that Facebook provided to the Commission about the corporal structure 
of the Company. It concludes that the offices of Facebook on Belgium is a permanent 
establishment of Facebook Inc. on Belgium and that Belgian law that implements the 
Data Protection Directive is applicable. 85   
 
As far as Google Inc., WhatsApp Inc. and Foursquare Labs Inc.86 are concerned, mindful 
of the Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party and of the Dutch Data Protection 
Authority, the dissertation considers that mobile devices should be qualified as 
equipment under the Article 4(c) and the Data Protection Directive should be applicable. 
In spite of the fact that different interpretations has been opined (see 79), the dissertation 
advocates the argument of the Article 29 Working Party and of the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority and for adding to their argument, the dissertation underlines that 
                                                   
 
84DAVID J. COLLIS, DAVID YOUNG AND MICHAEL GOOLD, “The Size, Structure and Performance 
of Corporate Headquarters” (2003) Strategy Unit Working Paper No.03-096 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=475162  
85 PRIVACY COMMISSION OF BELGIUM, “Recommendation no. 04/2015 of 13 May 2015” 
relating to 1) Facebook, 2) Internet and/or Facebook users, as well as 3) users and providers of 
Facebook services, particularly plug-ins”(2015). 
86 Google Inc., WhatsApp Inc. and Foursquare Labs Inc. are the developers of the Google Search 
and Google Maps, WhatsApp and Foursquare apps respectively. 
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apps are software installed in the mobile device. They interact with it through the API 
after the user has granted the permissions asked (see 2.1 Actors and their technologies). In this 
way, they control the processing activity on the mobile device of the user, what data are 
collected among the data stored on the device or generated by it, and for what 
purposes. 
 
Facebook, Google, Foursquare and WhatsApp, as data controllers, must, consequently, 
comply with the obligations stemming from the Data Protection Directive.  
 
Although by following the same argumentation, one can conclude to the applicability of 
the Data Protection and ePrivacy Directive when Apple and Google process personal 
data of their users, as manufacturers of the devices and developers of the OS and the 
apps’ stores, this is out of the scope of the present research. What is of utmost 
importance, is that device and OS manufacturers, as well the developers of the 
application marketplaces play a crucial role to the creation of the condition for the 
granting of a valid consent (see 2.1 Actors and their technologies). For that reason (also), they 
shall comply with the requirements of the Directives and facilitate the app developers 
to acquire a valid consent form the users.  
 
3.3.2.2 The ePrivacy Directive  
 
The applicability of the ePrivacy Directive is determined by its Article 3: 
“This directive shall apply to the processing of personal data in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communication services in public 
communication networks in the Community”. 87 
 
 The question arises, whether mobile applications provide “publicly available electronic 
communication services” under the meaning of the ePrivacy Directive. The Article 29 
Working Party has asserted that these services do not fall into the scope of the strict 
                                                   
87 Article 3 ePrivacy Directive 
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definition of "publicly available electronic communication services" 88 and they are 
considered as information society services.89 The ePrivacy Directive does not apply in 
the processing activities performed by the mobile applications thereupon. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that information society services do not fall into the scope 
of the ePrivacy Directive,90 that is not the case for its Article 5(3)91 under the title 
“Confidentiality of Communications” 92 The latter applies to every entity that stores 
information or gains access to information already stored in the terminal equipment of 
                                                   
88 In its Article 2 , under the title “Definitions”, Directive 2002/21/EC of the European  Parliament 
and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive) states that a) “electronic communications network” means 
transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other 
resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other 
electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, 
including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that 
they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television 
broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information 
conveyed;(….) (c) “electronic communications service” means a service normally provided for 
remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in 
networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control 
over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does not 
include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC, which do not 
consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks; 
(d) “public communications network” means an electronic communications network used 
wholly or mainly for the provision of publicly available electronic communications services. 
89 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 7 and ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on 
geolocation services on smart mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 8,9. 
90“even when such processing in performed via a public communications network.” ARTICLE 29 
DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 13/2011 on geolocation services on smart 
mobile devices, WP 185" (2011) 8, 9.  
91 Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive “Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or 
the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or 
user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her 
consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with 
Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any 
technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a 
communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for 
the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to 
provide the service”. 
92ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 7 and Eleni Kosta, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2013) 295. 
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the subscriber or user, regardless of its nature as information society service provider or 
electronic communication service provider.93  
 
The information stored in the terminal equipment does not need to be personal.94 
Recital 24 of the ePrivacy Directive implies that the rationale under Article 5(3) is the 
intervention into the private sphere of the data subject (the terminal equipment and 
the information stored in that), rather than the nature of information as personal. 95 
 
Assessment 
 
Having regard to the above, the examined apps as offering information society services 
“in (the territory of) the Community”96, are excluded from the scope of the application 
of the ePrivacy Directive. Nevertheless, since they store and gain access to information 
that is stored in the device (see 2.3.2 Privacy Policies and related documents), Article 5(3) of the 
ePrivacy Directive applies and the requirements stipulated in it about consent must be 
satisfied.97  
 
3.2.2.3 Location data- a category especially susceptible to interference threats 
 
In the context of the ePrivacy Directive, the EU regulator stipulated specific provisions 
for the processing of location data.  
 
Article 2(c) of the ePrivacy Directive states that location data are any data processed in 
an electronic communications network or by an electronic communications service 
                                                   
93 Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. 
94 ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
296. 
95 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural 
advertising, WP 171" (2010) 8,9. 
96 Article 3 ePrivacy Directive. 
97 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013)7,14. 
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indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly 
available electronic communications service.98 
 
Moreover, Article 9 (3) of the ePrivacy Directive says that:  
 
“Processing of location data other than traffic data in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 
2 must be restricted to persons acting under the authority of the provider of the public 
communications network or publicly available communications service or of the third 
party providing the value added service, and must be restricted to what is necessary for 
the purposes of providing the value added service.99 
 
This choice implies that location data are considered to contain especial pitfalls against 
the privacy of the user; 100 still and all, the ePrivacy Directive and, consequently, its 
Article 9 (3) do not apply on information society services.  
 
The Article 29 Working Party has pronounced that location data always relate to an 
identified or identifiable person; hence, location data are always personal data and, 
when processed, Data Protection Directive is applicable. 101 Generally speaking, this 
statement holds partly true102; however, in the context of the highly individualized 
                                                   
98Article 2(c)ePrivacy Directive. Recital 14 ePrivacy Directive stipulates that “ Location data may 
refer to the latitude, longitude, and altitude of the user’s terminal equipment, to the direction 
of travel, to the level of accuracy of the location information, to the identification of the network 
cell in which the terminal equipment is located at a certain point in time and to the time the 
location information was recorded”. 
99 Article 9(3)ePrivacy Directive. 
100 COLLETE CUIJPERS AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “How fragmentation in European law undermines 
consumer protection:the case of location-bases services” (2008) 33 European Law Review 886. 
101 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion on the use of location data with a 
view to providing value-added services WP 115”(2005) 3. 
102 ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
327 and COLLETE CUIJPERS AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “How fragmentation in European law 
undermines consumer protection:the case of location-bases services” (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 888. KOSTA argues that "This statement is correct insofar as location data are treated in 
the context of the ePrivacy Directive and are examined in compliance to the definition of Article 
2(c) of the Directive.(..)Therefore location information that cannot be linked directly or indirectly 
to a natural person does not qualify as location data under the meaning of Article 2(c) of the 
Directive." and CUIJPERS AND KOOPS opine that "(...)it is questionable whether this statement is 
correct, since location data can also related to objects that are not linkable to individual natural 
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mobile applications’ terrain, location data are personal data and the application of the 
Data Protection Directive is triggered.  
 
Assessment  
 
In the context of our research and according to the findings, all of the examined apps, 
except WhatsApp, collect and process location data (see 2.3.2 Privacy Policies and related 
documents). Google Maps and Foursquare are Location Based Services. Nonetheless, 
since apps provide information society and not electronic communication services, the 
strict prerequisites for the processing of location data provided in Article 9 (3) of the 
ePrivacy Directive are not applicable.  
 
Given the highly individualized mobile ecosystem that makes easy and possible the 
identification or identifiability of a person, in the context of the present research 
location data are personal data and, as far as their processing is concerned, the Data 
Protection Directive is applicable.  
 
3.3.3 Legal ground for the processing of personal data- Consent  
 
According to Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive, 
 
“the data subject's consent shall mean any freely given, specific and informed indication 
of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating 
to him being processed.”103 
 
Article 2(f) of the ePrivacy Directive says that “consent by a user or a subscriber 
corresponds to the data subject’s consent in Directive 95/46/EC “.104 
 
                                                   
persons." CUIJPERS AND KOOPS present a figure with the relationship between personal, traffic 
and location data . 
103 Article 2(h) Data Protection Directive. 
104 Article 2(f) ePrivacy Directive. 
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In accordance with Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive the data controller needs a 
legal ground to process personal data.105 In the mobile applications ecosystem, the most 
commonly applicable legal ground is the consent of the data subject (Article 7(a)). 106 
Consent shall be provided unambiguously.107 Furthermore, Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive states that the storing or the gaining of access to information in the terminal 
device of the user is allowed only after the user has given his consent “having been 
provided with clear and comprehensive information”.108 
 
It can be concluded that the requirements for a valid consent under the Data Protection 
Directive and the ePrivacy Directive are overlapping and in practice, the two types of 
consent are merged.  
 
Consent must be obtained before the storing or accessing of information. This has been 
an interpretation based on the wording of the Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive.109 
The same Article stipulates that consent is not required when the storing or the gaining 
access to information is strictly necessary for an information society service provider to 
provide a service explicitly requested by the user. This norm, consisting an exemption to 
the consent requirements, must be narrowly interpreted. The Article 29 Working Party 
interprets that the technical storage or access must be so necessary for the provisions 
                                                   
105 Article 7 Data Protection Directive stipulates that “Member States shall provide that personal 
data may be processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) 
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party in 
order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) 
processing is necessary for compliance with legal obligation to which the controller is subject or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or ( e ) 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are 
disclosed; or (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by 
the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject which require protection under Article 1(1).  
106 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 14. 
107 Article 7(a) Data Protection Directive. 
108 Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive. 
109 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 32. 
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of the specific functionality that the user has requested as if it is disabled, the 
functionality will not be available.110 
 
Consent must be freely given, specific and informed as well as an unambiguous 
indication of the data subject’s will. Indication can be any sign, understandable by the 
data controller that shows the wishes of the data subject. The Article 29 Working Party 
encourages data controllers to create the necessary tools so as to be able to prove that 
valid consent has been granted by users and, in particular, by the data subject.111. 
 
Consent is related to the concept of informational self-determination and if it is properly 
used, it provides data subjects control over the processing of their data.112 Connected 
to the notion of control is also the right of the data subjects to withdraw their 
consent.113Nonetheless, consent, if incorrectly used, instead of offering data subjects an 
actual control, it may lead to an illusion of it. 114 Therefore, the prerequisites for a valid 
consent must be followed with fidelity by the data controllers. 
 
3.3.3.1 “….freely given...” 
 
The exercise of the data subjects ‘control over the processing of their personal data can 
be real only if it is their “genuine free choice” and “voluntary decision”115. This means 
                                                   
110 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent 
Exemption WP 194”4. 
111 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013). 
112 ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
220. 
113For more information see, ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 
15/2011 on the definition of consent WP187” (2011) and ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European 
Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 251. 
114 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 8,9. 
115 “free consent means a voluntary decision, by an individual in possession of all of his faculties, 
taken in the absence of coercion of any kind, be it social, financial, psychological, or other 
(…)Reliance on consent should be confined to cases where the individual data subject has a 
genuine free choice and is subsequently able to withdraw the consent without detriment” 
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent 
WP187” (2011) 13. 
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that, in case the data subjects decides not to consent, they should not face important 
aftereffects. Practically put, when asked to give their consent for the processing of a 
specific category of data, users must be given the choice to give, or not give their 
consent. 116 
 
In the mobile devices ecosystem, consent is freely given when end users have the choice 
to accept or refuse the processing of their personal data. The question arises, if in the 
case that refusal of consent equals the deprivation of the possibility to use the app, the 
consent can still be considered as freely given. One may think that in this case, the 
decision of users is not free, as it is leads to their exclusion of the use of the app. Recital 
25 the ePrivacy Directive, clarifying the provisions about cookies and similar 
technologies states that, if the storage of a cookie by a website in the terminal device of 
the user is justified by a legitimate purpose, such as to facilitate the provision of the 
services, then access to the particular website can be refused, if users, after having been 
properly informed, do not give their consent to the storage of cookies.117 An analog 
interpretation of this Recital for the case of the mobile applications can lead to the 
conclusion that, the accessibility to the application may be conditional on the granting 
consent by the users for the processing of their data, or better, of a specific category of 
                                                   
116 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 14. 
117 Recital 25 ePrivacy Directive “However, such devices, for instance so-called ‘cookies’, can be 
a legitimate and useful tool, for example, in analysing the effectiveness of website design and 
advertising, and in verifying the identity of users engaged in on-line transactions. Where such 
devices, for instance cookies, are intended for a legitimate purpose, such as to facilitate the 
provision of information society services, their use should be allowed on condition that users are 
provided with clear and precise information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC about the 
purposes of cookies or similar devices so as to ensure that users are made aware of information 
being placed on the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the opportunity to 
refuse to have a cookie or similar device stored on their terminal equipment. This is particularly 
important where users other than the original user have access to the terminal equipment and 
thereby to any data containing privacy-sensitive information stored on such equipment. 
Information and the right to refuse may be offered once for the use of various devices to be 
installed on the user's terminal equipment during the same connection and also covering any 
further use that may be made of those devices during subsequent connections. The methods for 
giving information, offering a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as user-
friendly as possible. Access to specific website content may still be made conditional on the well-
informed acceptance of a cookie or similar device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose.” 
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data, if this process is justified on legitimate purposes. Consent can be considered as 
freely given in that case thereupon.118 
 
3.3.3.2 “….specific… “  
 
For consent to be specific, the data subject must be clearly and precisely informed about 
which data are processed and for what purposes.119 Therefore, for consent to be 
specific, data subjects must be properly informed. 120 
 
It has been argued that consent should be limited to the processing of a specific data 
group and should not consist a general "green light" to the accessing and processing 
activities.121  
 
In its recommendations to the different players in the mobile apps field, the Article 29 
Working Party has been in favour of granularity in the acquisition of consent 
mechanisms and it calls the players to work on it. Besides, a practical implementation of 
the right on informational self-determination requires that users are given the possibility 
to permit process on a specific category of their personal data and refuse access to 
another. 
 
In this framework, users should be given the possibility not only to consent on the 
processing of a specific category of data, but also to opt-out of the processing for a 
specific purpose. Given the high privacy concerns connected to online behavioural 
                                                   
118 ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
312. 
119 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 17 and ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 219 
120 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 17 
121 Ibid. 
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advertising, data controllers are expected to have implemented opt-out possibilities at 
least for the processing of data for advertising purposes.122  
 
3.3.3.3 “….informed…” – Obligation of providing information (Article 10 and 11 of the 
Data Protection Directive) 
 
Consent is informed when it is based upon knowledge by data subjects on the facts 
around the processing of their personal information and the consequences of refusing 
to consent. This information should be provided to users prior to the consent granting 
and should be based on “the reasonable expectations of the parties”. 123 
 
Articles 10 and 11 Data Protection Directive set the obligation of data controllers to 
provide information to the data subjects. This obligation is distinct but, in most cases 
intrinsically connected to the notion of informed consent. 124 
 
Thereupon, when processing data, the data controller must mandatorily inform users 
about: 
 
(a) Its identity (who is legally responsible for the processing and its contact details, 
physical and electronic address) 125, 
(b) what precise categories of personal data it processes and for what precise 
purposes (Article 10(a) and (b)) 
 
                                                   
122 Opt out mechanism for sharing information for advertising purposes. The Article 29WP on 
its........ remarks that this system is an improving step however, it cannot be considered as valid 
consent. 'It cannot be conclude that users who have not objected to being tracked for purposes 
of serving behavioural advertising have exercised a real choice.  
123 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 17. 
124 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 19. 
125 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 22. 
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In the circumstances of mobile applications, it is considered that the data controller is 
obliged by Article 10(c), and it is necessary in order to make the consent informed, to 
provide additional information on whether data will be disclosed to third parties and on 
how users may exercise their rights. 126 
 
Before end users decide whether they consent on the processing of their personal data 
by an application, this information must be given to them through the application 
marketplaces. Likewise, it is necessary that this information is accessible after the 
installation within the app.127 In both cases, it must be visible and easily accessible by 
the users and written in plain language, understandable by an average user of the 
audience the app is addressed to.128 
 
It has been a challenge to the data controllers to decide how much information needs 
to be provided to users, and not exceed the limits that would lead to the provision of an 
exaggerated amount of information, with the danger of misleading the data subject.129 
This decision becomes even harder in the context of mobile application, where data 
controllers have to face the additional challenge of the small screen.  
 
3.3.4.4   “…unambiguously…”  
 
For consent to be unambiguous (article 7(a) Data Protection Directive), the action of the 
data subjects must leave no doubt that consists a consent to the processing of their 
data.130  
                                                   
126 Ibid In addition to the above minimum scope of information, necessary in order to seek 
consent from the app user, the Working Party in view of fair processing of personal data strongly 
advises that the data controllers also provide to the users information on: [Symbol] 
proportionality considerations for the types of data collected or accessed on the device, 
[Symbol] retention periods of the data, [Symbol] security measures applied by the data 
controller. 
127 Ibid 23. 
128 Ibid. 
129 For more information see ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 210. 
130 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011) 20. 
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Consent is an interaction between the data subject and the data controller, not easy to 
take place online. It is important that the means used for acquiring consent are the 
expectable and that controller make sure that the subject has actively and validly given 
his consent. Users must be provided with guidance about which exactly of their action 
signifies their consent. 131 
 
3.3.4 Layered information notices  
 
Privacy and Data Protection organizations internationally prompt data controllers to 
provide users with the necessary information through layered privacy notices.132 The 
Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion 10/2004 on more harmonized information 
provisions elaborates on a model of three layers of information with the purpose of 
providing users meaningful and appropriate information and consequently enhance 
awareness on the data protection issues. 133 The information that should be included in 
each layer will be further elaborated in Chapter 4 (see 4.2 Layered information and 
consent-granting-mechanisms).  
 
Assessment 
 
Evaluating the findings of the research in the light of the provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive for a valid consent has not been an easy task. There are a lot of 
parameters that should be examined. The most important are the way and time that the 
information is provided to the users, as well as the language used.  
 
Summarising the findings, the language used during the installation procedure and in 
the Privacy Policy documents is generally plain without jargon. When permissions are 
                                                   
131 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011). 
132 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised 
Information Provisions WP 100” (2004). 
133 Ibid. 
  -47- 
requested, users are informed about the category of data the application needs access 
to and the reason why access to the specific category is needed.134 On the page of the 
application in Google Play Store there is a link named “Permissions” where users can 
learn more on the permissions needed by the app. Full information on the data 
processing activities is provided in the Privacy Policies of each application, the link to 
which is presented on the page of the app on both Google Play Store and App Store. The 
information provided to the users covers the requirements of the Article 10 of the Data 
Protection Directive.135Applications access personal information of the users stored in 
or generated by the mobile device for purposes of, among others, the provision of 
advertising services.  
 
It is apparent that the examined data controllers attempt to interpret and apply the legal 
provisions. Nonetheless, the following concerns create doubts on whether the practices 
followed satisfy the requirements for a valid consent. 
 
First of all, in no step of the downloading and installation procedure are data subjects 
clearly asked to give their consent to the processing of their personal data; when 
applications ask for permissions, they ask to be granted access to a particular category 
of data stored on the device without any explicit and specific reference to what data are 
actually collected and for what purposes. When investigated by the Office of Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, Google, as the owner and overseer of Android OS, explained 
that "permissions are a security and transparency feature, and do not necessarily equate 
with functions that the App will, in practice, perform without further notice to the 
individual" and that “permissions are not ‘consent’ per se”.136 In other words, 
permissions is like opening a technical gate to the apps to access these categories of 
data. This does not equate to providing information about what data are collected and 
for what purposes. Permissions are not a notification on data processing and a call for 
consent granting.  
                                                   
134 In Android, this depends on the information that the application developer has provided. 
135 Google Privacy Policy does not include the contact details of the data controller. 
136 OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, “Findings under the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) PIPEDA report of findings #2014-
008” (2014) 8,9. 
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The Canadian Privacy Office concluded that: 
"As it currently exists, the Android permissions model is unclear. In particular, it is not 
clear that: (i) the permissions represented data and functions to which an app has access, 
and not necessarily its behaviors; (ii) the description provided for each permission does 
not necessarily describe the app’s actual use of that permission; and (iii) an individual 
should look elsewhere for a full description of an app’s actual collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information."137 
 
Secondly, the use of plain language does not mean that this information is always 
meaningful. In a survey conducted in 2012, a high percentage of the surveyed, after 
reading the Privacy Policy of Facebook and Google, could not understand how their 
information were shared by the applications and with whom.138 In the same survey, the 
surveyed found easier to understand a bank credit card agreement and a government 
notice than to understand Google's and Facebook's Privacy Policies. Long documents, as 
that of Facebook does not guarantee that essential information is efficiently 
communicated to the end user. Succinct information should be provided. Phrases such 
us, "Foursquare may share...”139 undermine the satisfaction of the requirement for a 
specific and informed consent. Users are not able to understand whether and under 
what circumstances their data are shared. Terms that may not be a jargon but at the 
same time the average user is not expected to understand, like 'background location" 
are widely used140 The language used to present the information and the respective 
ability of users to understand the meaning of the information is determinative for the 
exercise of the right of informational self-determination. A prove is that more than 30% 
of the surveyed-users of Facebook and Google, after comprehending the information 
included in the aforementioned Privacy Policies, planned to change the settings of their 
applications and being more circumspect in sharing information. The various links to the 
                                                   
137 Ibid 13. 
138 SimplicityLabTM Consumer Research Survey available at  http://www.siegelgale.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Privacy-Policy-Report-2012April_FINAL-online.pdf (accessed on 
30/01/16). 
139 https://foursquare.com/legal/privacy (accessed on 03/02/2016) 
140 Ibid. 
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Help Centre etc may be helpful to provide detailed information to the users, however 
they create the feeling that endless hours are needed to understand how their data are 
collected and processed, and this practice should be avoided. The information provided 
is not always comprehensive and coherent. 
 
Opting out of the processing of personal information for the provision of interest-based 
advertisements is actually offered by no one of the examined applications. As far as 
Facebook is concerned, one may wonder whether opting out of "seeing online interest 
based ads from Facebook"141 equals opting out of the processing of the data for 
purposes of online behavioural advertising. From the wording of the information 
provided on Facebook's Help Centre it seems more possible that users can opt-out only 
of the provision of interest-based advertising services. The same doubts arise of the 
wording used by Google. "You can opt-out of interest-based ads by Google...".142 When 
users opt-out are still their personal data processed for the purpose of providing 
interest-based ads? After all, Google and Facebook have interest in providing 
immediately online behavioural advertising services in case users change their decision 
and opt-in.  Additionally, are personal information shared with third parties for the same 
purposes? Foursquare do not provide any opt-out possibility. As far as WhatsApp is 
concerned, based on the findings, it does not use information for advertising purposes.  
 In this way users cannot specifically and freely decide and protect their personal sphere 
from interferences based on the tracking of their activities and on profiling. Yet, for 
Facebook and Google, their popularity results to them being important tools for many 
people’s everyday life and activities. This requires that first, further and clearer 
explanations are provided as far as what the opt-out possibilities mean and second, that 
alternatives are offered  so as users are not excluded of using the services if they wish 
to opt-out of behavioural advertising.143  
 
                                                   
141 https://www.facebook.com/help/164968693837950 (accessed on 03/02/2016) 
142 https://support.google.com/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en (accessed  on 03/02/2016) 
143 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of 
consent WP187” (2011)18,19. 
  -50- 
Moreover, there are data processed by the apps that do not depend on a permission 
granted by the user, such as the information that users provide while using the app (e-
mail address, posts, their location etc) (see 2.3.2 Privacy Policies and related documents). Users 
can learn about the processing of this category of information only if they read the 
Privacy Policy documents (the link to which can be found at the bottom of the page of 
the app in the application marketplaces). Reading a long Privacy Policy document to get 
informed about the processing procedures cannot be expected by the users. 144 
Moreover, they are not notified about that processing neither before nor after they have 
installed the app on their devices. The European Court of Justice has asserted that 
offering a hyperlink that does not oblige users to read the entire text is insufficient.145 
Therefore, the installation of the app should not be viewed as consent. Even if, 
hypothetically, information were provided to users before the installation, clicking the 
“install” button for Android and the respective icon for iOS, would equal a general 
authorization to the processing of personal data, which cannot qualify as specific 
consent 146 
 
Finally, the fact that users actually use the application, without having been properly 
notified about the processing activities and without having been given the information 
that Article 10 Data Protection Directive provides for, does not consist an action 
indicating consent to the processing of personal data.  
 
One may summarize that, in the aforementioned conditions, it is highly doubtable 
whether users can exercise their rights to informational self-determination and 
effectively protect their privacy. Information about the actual data protection activities 
are provided only in the Privacy Policy documents of the applications. One can be also 
dubious on whether the general presentation of information in those documents can 
create the conditions for a specific and informed consent to be granted. Users are never 
                                                   
144 ELENI KOSTA, “Consent in European Data Protection Law” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
217. 
145 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v 
Bundesarbeitskammer (2012) (ECLI:EU:C:2012:419). 
146 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 15. 
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actually asked to give their consent and the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Article 29 Working Party and other Privacy authorities seem necessary in order to 
create a veritable shield for the protection of the private sphere of the users.  
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Chapter 4: Paths to compliance 
 
Each application has its particular characteristics and a particular context surrounding 
it. At the same time, there are many alternatives that a data controller could adopt to 
achieve compliance. Based on the particularities of each mobile app, a different 
alternative may be considered as the most appropriate. Data controllers, with the aid of 
expert legal advisors, hold the key to understanding the required conditions for a valid 
consent and adapt the particular characteristics of their applications to it.  
 
Having consideration to the recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party147, to the 
findings of the present research and to the provisions of the law, the dissertation 
proposes possible alternatives that could build the path to a valid consent, in the context 
of the present research. Τhe following constitute indicative examples and alternatives 
and are certainly not the only pathways through which compliance can be achieved. 
Reconciling with the requirements of the Directives is not always easy to achieve, 
however app developers shall trigger their innovative capabilities, ask for the advice of 
expert lawyers or of the Data Protection Authorities and understand that protecting the 
privacy of users and building trust with them result to their own benefit as well. 
 
4.1 Common responsibilities 
 
The terrain of mobile applications is based on the interrelationship of the actors 
involved. As has been explained in Chapter 2, the choices of one of the actors affect the 
others. It can be securely said that compliance can only be achieved with the 
cooperation of all the parties involved. As the Article 29 Working Party observes, the 
responsibilities of those parties under the European data protection legal framework 
usually overlap.148  Along this line and with the purpose of facilitating compliance with 
                                                   
147 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2013 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013). 
148  Ibid 27. 
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law and building trust with end users, device and OS manufacturers, application 
marketplaces, app developers and third parties should work together on: 
 
• Providing to users meaningful, specific and adequate information before their 
personal information is being processed.  
• Provide users tools of control.  
• Create mechanisms needed so as to be able to prove that users have granted a valid 
consent.  
 
The application of the privacy by design principle can facilitate the achievement of the 
above.  
 
The role of the end user is equally determinative. It holds true that, in most countries, 
the majority of the app users do not read at all, or have a cursory glance to the Privacy 
Policies. One of the reasons is the length of these documents and this is generally 
understandable; nonetheless, users must be conscious, first, about the possible dangers 
hidden when their personal data are accessed and processed and, second, that by trying 
to get informed on the data processing activities of the data controllers is one of the 
most effective ways to, indirectly, force them to comply with the law and the only way 
to make mature decisions about the unveiling of their data. Users should realize that 
they are also one of the players in the mobile apps field; the most important one, to the 
protection of whom the legislation is aimed.  
 
4.2 Layered information and consent-granting-mechanisms 
 
With the view to provide users with shorter privacy notices, a system of three layers of 
information has been promoted internationally.149 
 
                                                   
149 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised 
Information Provisions WP 100” (2004). 
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The first layer (short privacy notice) should include the information required under 
Article 10 Data Protection Directive, as well as information on the way users can exercise 
their rights and any other information that is considered as necessary for each particular 
case. When information is shared with ad companies, opt-out possibilities shall be 
presented in the first layer.150 This layer could be presented in the application 
marketplace, near the install button or icon, so as users read it before they decide to 
install the application. 151Alternatively, it could appear in a pop-up window after users 
click on installing the app. 
 
The second layer (condensed privacy notice) should consist of the following: 
 
 The scope of the application of the privacy notice 
 Information accessed 
 Purposes&disclosures to third parties 
 Rights and options for the users 
 Contact details 
 Special requirements of the national law and, optionally, information on the 
national data protection authority.152 
 
The condensed privacy notice should appear if users clicks to learn more about privacy 
in the first layer. 
 
The Privacy Policy of the app can be considered as the third layer (full privacy notice) 
that provides all the needed information in details. The full notice does not need to be 
adjusted to the requirements of a small screen. Two categories could be created about 
the data processed, the mandatory for the provision of the service and the optional. 
Mechanisms should be provided so as users can opt-out from the optional category. 
Additionally, when information is shared, users shall be informed on the identity of the 
                                                   
150 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised 
Information Provisions WP 100” (2004) 8. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
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entities that their personal data are shared with. Data controllers must pay attention so 
that the full notice includes all national legal requirements and specifications. A solution 
can be a different full notice of each country where the services are provided. 153  
 
Each one of the layers shall provide the information needed at the particular point of 
time and circumstances for the user to make an informed decision. Cumulatively, the 
three layers shall satisfy the requirements of Article 10 Data Protection Directive.154 
 
Information provided should be succinct and the language used should be simple and 
direct, so as to be meaningful to all people expected to use the app. On that line, the 
WhatsApp Privacy Notice can be an example. "In order to provide the WhatsApp Service, 
WhatsApp will periodically access your address book or contact list on your mobile phone 
to locate the mobile phone numbers of other users”; clear and direct language like this 
that describes, how data is processed, what data is processed and for what purposes 
holds the attention of the user focused on the notice. App developers can play with the 
colour or add icons to put emphasis on, for instance, information processed that may be 
unexpected by the end user. It is useful that the same language and expressions are 
used in all the layers.  
 
Attention should be paid to the requirement for a granular consent.155This can be 
possible through the permissions mechanism. Nevertheless, as has been explained in 
Chapter 3 (see 3.3.3 Legal ground for the processing of personal data- Consent) permissions do not 
consist per se a consent granting mechanism.156 A solution could be that apps ask for 
permission strictly only in the case that they use it and they give more information on 
the processing (data, purposes and identity of the data controller) asking clearly the 
consent of the users. Following when the users are asked to grant permission the pop-
                                                   
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, "Opinion 2/2010 on apps on smart devices, 
WP 202" (2013) 14. 
156 OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, “Findings under the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) PIPEDA report of findings #2014-
008” (2014) 8,9. 
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up window should include a clear reference that granting permission means consenting 
to the processing of personal data. 
 
A specific and informed consent requires the notification of the users, in case the Privacy 
Policies are modified by the app developers. WhatsApp’s practice that calls users to 
revisit the website in order to stay aware of any changes cannot be accepted.157 Google 
provides an exemplary archive where the old versions of the Privacy Policies are kept. 
The points that have changed are marked. 
 
App developers can build various communication canals with their users. Blogs, for 
instance, that allow direct communication between users and the data controller can be 
proven mutually beneficial. Users can ask their questions and get immediate and 
concrete answers on privacy issues.  
 
Data controllers should realize that the Privacy Policies are like a Charter for the data 
processing activities. Whatever they write or omit to write in that Chapter creates 
responsibilities for them.  
 
Yet, Privacy Policy documents should be named in a way that calls users attention on 
that personal data are processed by the app. For instance, the title “Data policy” implies 
that the document refers to the data processing policies. In contrast the title “Privacy 
Policy” resembles a safety statement and brings in mind the idea that privacy is 
protected and may quell the interest of the users.  
 
4.3 Tools of control  
 
Βoth OS offer their users the possibility to withdraw a permission that has already 
granted to an app. This practice is endorsed and encouraged; howbeit, given all that has 
been analyzed above concerning permissions (see 3.3.3 Legal ground for the processing of 
                                                   
157 https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/ (accessed on 31/01/2016). 
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personal data- Consent), a withdrawal of permission is not a withdrawal of consent. The 
right to privacy, understood as a right to informational self-determination, should 
guarantee users not only the possibility to give their consent, but also to modify and 
withdraw it anytime. Consequently, the present system of controlling permissions 
should be complemented by a feature that provides control over the granting, modifying 
and withdrawal of consent over the categories of data actually processed by the 
applications. A reasonable period of time after users has granted consent, they should 
be reminded that several categories of their data are processed. Users could potentially 
choose how often they wish to be reminded. 
 
Google Services have developed a Dashboard where users can have an overview of their 
recent activity with regard to Google Services and manage their product settings. This 
Dashboard could be the right beginning and it could be supplemented with information 
about what data are accessed, in the context of which activities and how these data are 
used. Google has also developed an application, pre-installed in Android devices named 
“Google Settings" that offers users control on their Google account. Through these 
settings users can opt-out of several processing activities, learn more about those 
activities and change the setting on the environment of each application. Through those 
interfaces users could also be given the possibility to decide, up to a certain extent, on 
the retention periods for their personal data. This system could also give users an easy 
way to manage and refuse updates and deactivate or delete an app.  
 
It is necessary that the consent is granted by the data subject and not by someone else 
accidentally or periodically using the device. Request for a password before consent is 
requested could constitute an efficient solution. The relevant practice adopted by the 
App Store is encouraged (see 2.3 Current Practices). 
 
4.4 Structure of the Policies 
 
Facebook is an exemplary of clearly structured Privacy Policy document. The general 
categories are divided into subcategories. Different categories are presented with 
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different colour and accompanied by a different sign. That way, users can read the 
document more easily and without intermittent attention 
 
It can be said that Google Services Privacy Policy is an exemplary on the line of providing 
layered information to users. Nevertheless, this practice is different to that discussed 
above (see 4.2 Layered information and consent-granting-mechanisms) for the three 
layers of privacy notices recommended by the Article 29Working Party and cannot be 
considered as an alternative to it.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The assessment of the findings in the light of the legal framework formed by the Data 
Protection and ePrivacy Directives concludes that the information stored in or 
generated by mobile devices is personal, as, given the intimate connection of mobile 
devices to their users, in the majority of the cases it is linked to an identified or 
identifiable person.1 These data are processed by the examined application. The 
developers of the examined applications determine the means and purposes of 
accessing and processing this information and enunciate them in their Privacy Policy 
documents, qualified that way as data controllers.  
 
Facebook Ireland Ltd shall apply the provisions of the Data Protection Directive. Its 
headquarters in Ireland (that is a Member State of the European Union) is the data 
controller for the processing activities connected to data collected in the Territory of the 
European Union. Google, WhatsApp and Foursquare fall also under the scope of 
applicability of the Data Protection Directive, given that mobile devices are considered 
as means used by the data controller (Google Inc., WhatsApp Inc. and Foursquare Labs 
Inc.) for the collection and processing activities. On the other hand, the strict definitions 
of electronic communication services in the ePrivacy Directive exclude its applicability 
in the examined cases and, as far as location data are concerned, they are protected as 
personal data. All the actors examined in the present research are considered to be 
offering information society services. Applicable is, however, the Article 5(3) of the 
ePrivacy Directive. The applicability of the latter extends to information society services 
when they stores data and/or obtain access to data stored in the terminal equipment of 
the user. The apps, as such, are software stored in the device and they have access in 
information stored ιn the same device. Therefore, Facebook, Google Services, 
Foursquare and WhatsApp must ask for the consent of the userσ before the respective 
they access their data  
 
The prerequisites for a valid consent under the ePrivacy Directive overlap with those 
under the Data Protection Directive. Consent, under the latter, consists one of the legal 
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grounds for the processing of personal data and must equate with a freely given, specific 
and informed, unambiguous indication of the wishes of the data subject. A well 
informed user can create genuine and mutually beneficial dialogue with the app 
developers, “asking them” that way compliance with the law in return for trust and 
loyalty.  
 
The conditions for a valid consent can be created only with the collaboration of the app 
developers with the device and OS manufacturers and the app stores. Presently, despite 
the fact that both Android and Apple have improved their OS and app marketplaces on 
the direction of providing more information and control to the users, it can be said that, 
mainly because of the non-easily accessible and non-adequate information provided to 
the users, it is questionable whether valid consent for the processing is acquired.  
 
The Article 29WP as well as the privacy authorities of Canada and the United States of 
America have issued detailed recommendations with the purpose of facilitating app 
developers to create the tools for achieving compliance with the law. The final result 
must safeguard the balance of the legitimate rights of all the parties involved.  
 
Data controllers are called upon to apply their technical and entrepreneurial innovative 
skills and to build mechanisms able to overcome the challenges of the mobile 
applications ecosystem. An open dialogue with users, consumer unions and Data 
Protection Authorities can guarantee transparent and effective solutions awarded by 
the acceptance and preference of the users.   
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Figure 7 Facebook mobile app asking access to location services on iOS 9.2 
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Figure 9 Settings of iOS 9.2 
   
  -11- 
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